The failure of a generator aboard HMAS Farncomb is just the latest
problem faced by its fleet of 6 Collins Class diesel-electric
submarines – which are now reduced to just 1 operational vessel. That
readiness issue presents an immediate financial headache for
Australia’s government, and adds a longer-term challenge to the
centerpiece of Australia’s future naval force.
HMAS Farncomb photo defenseindustrydaily
With just 6
submarines in its fleet, Australia’s current deployment set-up leaves
little room for error. Even a normal setup of 2 in maintenance, 2 for
training but available if needed, and 2 on operations makes for a thin
line, given Australia’s long coastline and sea lanes. Instead,
Australia currently has 3 submarines in “deep maintenance” and
completely unavailable (HMAS Deschaineux, HMAS Sheean, and HMAS
Rankin), 1 submarine back in port and facing indeterminate maintenance
(HMAS Farncomb), 1 “limited availability” submarine fit for training
(HMAS Collins), and 1 operational boat (HMAS Waller) that was in port
for major battery repairs as recently as May 2009.
When crewing problems are added to the mechanical issues, Australia’s 2009 White Paper plan to build 12 diesel-electric fast attack submarines as the centerpiece of the 2030 Australian Navy is attracting questions.
The current issue with HMAS Farncomb involves failures in 1 of the
submarine’s 3 French Jeumont-Schneider, 1,400 kW/ 440-volt DC
generators. As the Australian Department of Defence puts it:
“The
problem stems from the way some of the generators were manufactured. At
no time was the crew at risk but investigations are continuing in order
to determine the impact this deficiency might have on the remainder of
the submarine fleet.”
A generator failure is a serious issue
for a diesel-electric submarine. The generators must power all systems
on board, from oxygen generation to combat electronics, and also drive
the Collins Class’ 7,200 shp Jeumont-Schneider DC motor. Given the
dangers inherent in a submarine’s mission, electrical redundancy,
back-up capability, and reliability are all critical.
There are
fears that fixing HMAS Farncomb’s generator problem could require
cutting open the pressurized hull. If that’s the case, repair costs
would be high, and Farncomb would join 3 other boats in a long “deep
maintenance cycle”. HMAS Deschaineux was due back in the water in early
2010. HMAS Sheean isn’t due back in service until 2011, and HMAS Rankin
has no set date yet – it is merely “in queue” behind Sheean. While HMAS
Collins has reportedly had its generators given a clean bill of health,
investigation of the entire fleet’s generators is underway. If
additional problems are discovered, the repair schedules for
Deschaineux, Sheean, and Rankin become much less predictable.
So, too, does the future success of Australia’s estimated A$ 36 billion future submarine program.
One of the goals for the Collins Class program was to advance
Australian shipbuilding capabilities, by creating state-owned ASC Pty
Ltd. to build a foreign submarine design. ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish
Kockums subsidiary was chosen to design them, based on the A19 Gotland Class. At 3,000t, their long-range design is the largest diesel-electric submarine type in the world.
Launching
a submarine building industry is very difficult, however, and using
what amounts to a new design adds to that risk. The Collins Class has
performed well in exercises with the US Navy, where it has scored
successes against American Los Angeles Class nuclear-powered fast
attack subs. On the other hand, it has also encountered a long-running
sequence of issues, including significant difficulties with its
(Australian chosen) combat systems, issues with acoustic signature due
to mechanical faults, major program cost growth to A$ 6+ billion, and
schedule slippage.
The effects aren’t just mechanical, or
financial. Crew retention issues are exacerbated by low mechanical
readiness, which restricts training opportunities and so limits the
available pool of crew. That forces higher deployment rates away from
home and family among qualified submariners, which in turn feeds back
into low recruitment and retention.
Collins was launched in 1993,
and delivered in 1996. Its successor boats of class were commissioned
in 1998 (Farncomb), 1999 (Waller), 2001 (Deschaineux and Sheean), and
2003 (Rankin). The persistence of serious mechanical issues, and very
low readiness rates, into 2010 and beyond, raises legitimate questions
concerning the long-term risks of Australia’s 12-submarine plan for its
future navy.
Australia is a middle power with a small population,
without a long submarine building tradition, and without an active
submarine construction line. That it overcame these disadvantages to
build and field the Collins Class is a respectable achievement,
notwithstanding the problems that class as faced in service. At the
same time, the strategic stakes in Asia are rising rapidly, and
submarines are becoming more important as the country’s neighbors grow
their economic and military power into the sea lanes around Australia.
An expanded submarine force makes strong strategic sense as a key
guarantor of Australian interests and sovereignty – but in some
respects, any new program will be starting again from square one. Over
a decade can be expected between the commissioning of HMAS Waller in
2003, and construction of any new submarines.
Does repeating the
Collins program’s industrial structure for the core of Australia’s
future defense risk creating the same cost and readiness issues in the
new submarines? If not, why not, especially given the long interval
between delivery of HMAS Rankin and future construction of the next
submarine type? What are the strategic risks of treating the core of
Australia’s future defensive posture as a make work program first, and
a defense program second? What savings might be had by simply ordering
some or all of the proposed 12 boats from a foreign manufacturer?
Should ASC become a wholly-owned subsidiary of whichever firm wins the
competition to build Australia’s next 12 boats? Or should the 12-sub
program just be scaled back sharply, as too big a risk for cost
inflation and low value for money?
Some of these questions are
already being raised, by politicians and media editorials. Unless these
readiness and technical issues can be turned around, Australia’s
governments, of whatever party, should expect more questions. (source defenseindustrydaily)
Posts
