Jin SSBN Flashes its Tubes

One of China’s two Jin-class SSBNs with two open missile tubes

One of China’s two new Jin-class SSBNs was photographed with two of its 12 missile tubes open when it visited Xiaopingdao Naval Base in March 2009.

The Jins are being readied to carry the JL-2, a single-warhead regional sea-launched ballistic missile that was most recently test-launched in May 2008. The class may become operational soon and replace the old Xia from 1982.

Xiaopingdao Naval Base, which is where I identified the Jin-class for the first time in 2007, serves as an outfitting and testing facility for new submarines and used to be the homeport of the single Golf-class diesel submarine China used for many years as a test launch platform for its first ballistic missile.

Two or three Jin-class SSBN have been under construction, and it remains to be seen if China will build up to five as projected by U.S. intelligence. China’s nuclear submarines appear to be the noisiest nuclear submarines in the world and will probably be highly vulnerable at sea.

Navy maintains the unidentified object not Chinese submarine

Commander says the object does not dive rapidly to escape detection, but continues on its course.

The Navy said yesterday the unidentified object spotted under water near its top base last week was not a Chinese submarine or a sea mammal.

A newspaper reported Sunday that an anti-submarine helicopter found a submarine within Taiwanese territorial waters near the naval base of Tsoying during military maneuvers on Jan. 27. As soon as the Navy called on the submarine to identify itself, it fled out of the area without responding, leading to suspicions it came from China, the reports said.

The Navy denied the report, saying sonar showed up an unidentified object which could not have been a submarine.

Yesterday, 168th Fleet Commander Lee Tung-fang said the object did not dive rapidly to escape detection, but continued on its course at a speed of 2 nautical miles an hour. The data told the Navy that there were no submarines, whales, dolphins or sunken ships involved, Lee said.

The 168th fleet had originally been patrolling off Taiwan's east coast, but was called to the area off Kaohsiung's Tsoying base to participate in anti-submarine drills, he said.

The area in the Taiwan Straits was difficult terrain for finding submarines, the senior officer told reporters. His unit had previous experience with locating underwater objects inside Taiwanese territorial waters which later turned up not to be submarines, according to Lee.

China's 'Third Island' Strategy

Analysts have long wondered if the Chinese navy (PLAN) had a third island chain strategy, beyond the publicly declared strategies for the first island chain (centered on Taiwan) and second island chain (extending from Japan to Indonesia). Many American commentators believed that such a strategy would refer to the ability to project power capable of reaching America's bases in Hawaii.

However, China's recent maritime activities -- such as its extended counterpiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and its involvement in a number of port development projects in Indian Ocean littorals (dubbed the "string of pearls") -- have raised the suspicion in Indian defense circles that the third island chain lies in the Indian Ocean, and specifically refers to the waters surrounding the Indian Andaman and Nicobar islands.

China wary of Russian naval repairs

 

Pic : FAS

China has procured from Russia 12 Kilo class submarines and four 956E/EM DDGs, or guided missile destroyers, since 1993. The first two Vasayanka-class Kilo submarines were exported to China in 1993, and the second two Kilo 636 submarines were delivered in 1996. The first two 956E DDGs were delivered in 1996 and 1999 respectively.

These battleships are now all due for overhaul or technical upgrading. But there are differences between China and Russia as to how this is to be done. Simply, China does not wish to trust its naval equipment to Russian technical experts.

A senior authoritative source from the Russian military industry said that for submarines, maintenance is more important that building the vessels themselves. Maintenance was not a major topic of discussion when the submarines were purchased, he said, but with the PLA Navy submarines due for overhaul, Russia and China have been involved in long drawn-out discussions.

 

In fact, the discussions have been under way for four years, the source said, adding that providing overhaul services was not necessarily included in the permit to export submarines.

China's Subs Getting Quieter

But Still Louder Than Older Russian Submarines
30 November 2009

The Chinese Navy appears to be stressing quality over quantity as it modernizes its submarine force, according to a U.S. Navy intelligence report. But China still has a way to go on quality. Some of its newest submarines are as noisy as subs built decades ago.

Nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarines are designed to give China's naval force, known as the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), "a credible second-strike capability," the U.S. Navy said in an August intelligence report that surfaced briefly on the Office of Naval Intelligence Web site, then vanished. The report was captured and published by the Federation of American Scientists.

The Jins - there are two in service - are more advanced than China's first-generation Xia ballistic missile submarines, but they're not exactly stealth machines.

According to a chart in the U.S. Navy report, Jins are louder than Soviet Delta III submarines built 30 years ago.

That raises questions about just how useful the submarines might be as a deterrent, said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.

Second-strike capability is intended to cause adversaries to refrain from attacking because whoever has second-strike capability can counterattack. But putting ballistic missiles on noisy submarines might not be an effective second-strike strategy.

"If these are clunkers that you can hear all the way to Hawaii," they are likely to be quickly found and sunk in any conflict with the U.S. or Russian navies, Kristensen said. "With this noise level, they're very detectable."

A new Chinese nuclear attack submarine called a Type 095 rates better on the U.S. Navy's noise scale, but it is still louder than a 20-year-old Soviet-designed Akula attack sub, according to the Navy chart. The 095 submarines are expected to begin entering the Chinese fleet in 2015.

Even if they are noisy, they are not as noisy as the Han- and Shang-class nuclear attack submarines that came before them, the intelligence chart shows.

This is apparently the first time a U.S. Navy description of the noise levels of modern Chinese and Russian nuclear submarines has been made public, Kristensen said. The report is titled "The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy With Chinese Characteristics."

Threat or Not?

There are two ways to interpret the U.S. Navy's data, a U.S. government naval expert said. One is that China's noisy submarines are inferior to any in the U.S. fleet, and therefore not much of a threat. The other is that the new subs demonstrate that Chinese submarine technology is getting better, and loud though they might be, Chinese submarines are getting quieter.

And real performance in the ocean is "not quite as one-dimensional as the Navy's chart depicts," he said. China's submarines can be quieter under certain operating conditions.

On the whole, however, the new Chinese submarines are "not anything at this point that we should panic over in terms of detecting and tracking them," he said.

According to the U.S. Navy, China currently has three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, six nuclear-powered attack submarines and 53 diesel-electric attack submarines.

This 62-sub fleet is expected to grow to about 75 by 2020 or 2025 as new submarines, including non-nuclear air independent propulsion vessels, are added to the fleet.

The intelligence report also predicts that all of China's new attack submarines will probably be armed with advanced cruise missiles. Today's attack submarines are armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, wake-homing torpedoes and mines, according to a Nov. 23 report by the Congressional Research Service.

China's Jins are designed to carry 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with a range of 3,888 nautical miles, according to the U.S. Defense Department's annual Chinese Military Power report.

The Naval Intelligence report said that with Jin-class submarines and JL-2 ballistic missiles, "China is developing a near-continuous at-sea strategic deterrent." The missiles are "capable of reaching the continental United States from Chinese littorals," giving the PLAN "its first credible second-strike nuclear capability."

Kristensen said he's not convinced.
Citing other Defense Department numbers, he said missiles fired from Jin-class submarines in Chinese waters "would fall into the sea about 800 kilometers [about 500 miles] from Seattle."

"With the range this system has, it is not a system that can target the United States unless they sail well into the Pacific," Kristensen said. "I'm very puzzled about why the Chinese would be putting their crown jewels - JL-2 missiles - on submarines that are that vulnerable."

Using Jin submarines only makes sense as a deterrent "if they survive. And a blunt claim would be that they would not survive in a war with the United States," he said.

The Jin and its missiles appear to be "a regional weapon," that could threaten Japan or U.S. military assets on Guam, he said.

Perhaps the Jins are not intended to be a deterrent against the United States. Their missiles might be intended to deter Russia, which has a history of border tensions with China, Kristensen said.

India also may be a target for Chinese deterrence. India has nuclear weapons, but as yet, none that can strike as far as China, he said.

Or perhaps the submarines and their missiles are intended as a display of national pride, he said. When nations become military powers, one of the things they do is build ballistic missile submarines, Kristensen said.

Lt. Cmdr. Billy Ray Davis, a U.S. Navy spokesman, said no one was available to answer questions about the report.
Original News

Type 094 (Jin Class) Nuclear-Powered Missile Submarine

The Type 094 (also referred to as Type 09-IV, NATO reporting name: Jin class) is the PLA Navy’s second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), succeeding the Type 092 (Xia class) SSBN of a single hull commissioned in 1983. The Type 094 was designed by CSIC’s Wuhan 2nd Ship Design Institute (also known as 719 Institute) in Wuhan, Hubei Province and built by CSIC’s Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. (previously known as Bohai Shipyard) in Huludao, Liaoning Province.

Programme

The development of the Type 094 began in the late 1980s to early 1990s, reportedly with assistance of the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering in St. Petersburg, one of Russia’s primary nuclear submarine designer.

Construction of the first-of-class began in 1999 and the submarine was launched in July 2004. A second hull was launched possibly in 2007 and may be commissioned in 2010. Both submarine have been undergoing sea trials, with no test launching of the ballistic missile from the submarine reported so far. The initial operational capability of the submarines may not come until 2012~2015.

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) predicted in December 2006 that the PRC will need to build a total of five Type 094 SSBNs in order to maintain a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence, with at least one boat available and ready for missile launch at all times.

Satellite images have captured the two Type 094 SSBNs docked at the Bohai Shipyard, and one of the submarines was also spotted inside the PLA Navy’s nuclear submarine base at Xiaopingdao, Liaoning Province. In April 2008, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website revealed that a Type 094 SSBN has been deployed to a newly-built nuclear submarine base near the city of Sanyang in Hainan Island [1].

Design

The Type 094 SSBN bears many similarities with the Type 093 Shang class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), suggesting that the two submarines share the same design baseline. The submarine features a water-drop shape hull, with a pair of fin-mounted hydroplanes and four diving planes.

The dive displacement of the submarine was estimated to be 8,000~9,000 tonnes. The Type 094 has yet approached the performance and capability of modern Russian and Western SSBN designs, especially in quietness and missile number. However, once fully operational, it will offer the PLA Navy with a much more credible sea-based nuclear retaliation capability than that offered by its predecessor Type 092 Xia class.

Missiles

The Type 094 has the capacity to carry 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The JuLang 2 SLBM designed and developed by CASIC 4th Academy is a three-stage, solid-propellant strategic ballistic missile. It is a derivation of the land-based DongFeng 31 (DF-31) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The maximum range of the JuLang 2 was estimated to be 7,000~8,000km, three times that of the first-generation JuLang 1 SLBM used by the Type 092.

Each JuLang 2 can carry a single thermalnuclear warhead of 25~1,000kt yield. Alternatively, the missile was said to be able to carry three or more 90kT multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV),  though this cannot be confirmed.

Torpedoes

The submarine has six 533mm bow torpedo tubes, and carries a total of 12 Yu-3 (SET-65E) torpedoes, which is equipped with both active and passive homing. The torpedo, with a 205kg warhead, has a maximum range of 15km and a top speed of 40kt. Alternatively, the submarine may carry wake-homing anti-surface torpedoes or wire-homing anti-submarine torpedoes.

Sensors

The submarine is fitted with sophisticated sonar systems, including bow-mounted sonar and H/SQC-207 flank-mounted sonar. Three flank-mounted sonar arrays are clearly visible on the hull of the submarine.

Propulsion

The submarine’s propulsion system is believed to be nuclear, turbo-electric arrangement, consisting of one pressurised water reactor (PWR), with one shaft.

Shiplist

No.	Name	Shipyard	Fleet	Launch	IOC
?	?	Bohai	North Sea	2004	?
?	?	Bohai	South Sea?	2007	?

Specifications

Displacement: (Dived) 8,000~9,000t
Missile: 12 X JL-2 SLBM

(sinodefenece)

China’s Noisy Nuclear Submarines

China’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine is noisier than the Russian Delta III-class submarines built more than 30 years ago, according to a report produced by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

The report The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy With Chinese Characteristics, which was first posted on the FAS Secrecy News Blog and has since been removed from the ONI web site, is to my knowledge the first official description made public of Chinese and Russian modern nuclear submarine noise levels.

Force Level

The report shows that China now has two Jin SSBNs, one of which is based at Hainan Island with the South Sea Fleet, along with two Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The Jin was first described at Hainan in February 2008 and the two Shangs in September 2008. The second Jin SSBN is based at Jianggezhuang with the North Sea Fleet alongside the old Xia-class SSBN and four Han-class SSNs.

The report confirms the existence of the Type 095, a third-generation SSN intended to follow the Type 093 Shang-class. Five Type 095s are expected from around 2015. The Type-95 is estimated to be noisier than the Russian Akula I SSN built 20 years ago.

Missile Range

The ONI report states that the JL-2 sea-launched ballistic missile on the Jin SSBNs has a range of ~4,000 nautical miles (~7,400 km) “is capable of reaching the continental United States from Chinese littorals.” Not quite, unless Chinese littorals extend well into the Sea of Japan. Since the continental United States does not include Alaska and Hawaii, a warhead from a 7,400-km range JL-2 would fall into the sea about 800 km from Seattle. A JL-2 carrying penetration aids in addition to a warhead would presumably have a shorter range.

Alaska would be in range if the JL-2 is launched from the very northern parts of Chinese waters, but Hawaii is out of range unless the missile is launched from a position close to South Korea or Japan. The U.S. Defense Department’s 2009 report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China also shows the range of the JL-2 to be insufficient to target the Continental United States or Hawaii from Chinese waters. The JL-2 instead appears to be a regional weapon with potential mission against Russia and India and U.S. bases in Guam and Japan.

Patrol Levels

The report also states that Chinese submarine patrols have “more than tripled” over the past few years, when compared to the historical levels of the last two decades.

That sounds like a lot, but given that the entire Chinese submarine fleet in those two decades in average conducted fewer than three patrols per year combined, a trippling doesn’t amout to a whole lot for a submarine fleet of 63 submarines. According to data obtained from ONI under FOIA, the patrol number in 2008 was 12.

Since only the most capable of the Chinese attack submarines presumably conduct these patrols away from Chinese waters – and since China has yet to send one of its ballistic missile submarines on patrol – that could mean one or two patrols per year per submarine.

Implications

The ONI report concludes that the Jin SSBN with the JL-2 SLBM gives the PLA Navy its first credible second-strike nuclear capability. The authors must mean in principle, because in a war such noisy submarines would presumably be highly vulnerabe to U.S. or Japanese anti-submarine warfare forces. (The noise level of China’s most modern diesel-electric submarines is another matter; ONI says some are comparable to Russian diesel-electric submarines).

That does raise an interesting question about the Chinese SSBN program: if Chinese leaders are so concerned about the vulnerability of their nuclear deterrent, why base a significant portion of it on a few noisy platforms and send them out to sea where they can be sunk by U.S. attack submarines in a war? And if Chinese planners know that the sea-based deterrent is much more vulnerable than its land-based deterrent, why do they waste money on the SSBN program?

The answer is probably a combination of national prestige and scenarios involving India or Russia that have less capable anti-submarine forces.
source : fas

CHINESE ANTISHIP MISSILES

* Along with Termit derivatives, the Chinese have also developed an air-launched ASM said to be derived from the Exocet, designated the "C-801". The resemblance is actually slight, though it is in a similar class to the Exocet and is powered by a solid-fuel rocket. It can be fired from ship, shore battery, or aircraft.

Specifications
Contractor	CHETA - China Hai Yang [Sea Eagle] Electro-Mechanical Technology - CASC 3rd Academy
Entered Service
Total length	5.81 m
Diameter	0.36 m
Wingspan	1.18 m
Weight	625 kg (not including booster)
Warhead Weight	165 kg HE
Propulsion	one solid rocket engine, one solid booster
Maximum Speed
Maximum effective range	8-42 km
Guidance mode	automatic control + homing
Single-shot hit probability	75%

The C-801 led to the "C-802", which features a turbojet engine instead of a solid-fuel rocket engine. Iran has obtained the C-801 and C-802; one such missile passed on to the Lebanese Hezbollah Shiite militia was used to attack an Israeli patrol boat during the fighting in the summer of 2006. It damaged the patrol boat and sank a small Egyptian freighter.
The Chinese are also believed to have built a number of other antiship missiles in various classes and with a confusing array of designations, but details remain unclear and not all appear to have been actually put into service.

Type 092 Xia Class SSBN

In 1981 China launched the Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic Missile submarine (SSBN), derived from the Han-class SSN. A ballistic missile submarine force would enhance Beijing's assurance of an effective retaliatory capability, as well as strengthening her deterrent posture. Despite a potential for operations in the Pacific Ocean, capabilities would be very limited against modern Western or Russian ASW capabilities.

Specifications
Displacement	6,500 tons (dived) [6500-8000 ton]
Length	393.6 ft
Beam	33 ft
Draft	26.2 ft
Speed	22 kts (dived)
Crew	140
Propulsion	Nuclear turbo-electric 1 PWR 90 MW 1 shaft
Missiles	12 JL-2 2-stage solid fuel inertial guidance to 4,320 nm warhead 3 or 4 MIRV nuclear 90 kT or single nuclear 250 kT
Torpedoes	6 - 21 in (533 mm) bow tubes SET-65E active/passive homing to 8.1 nm at 40 kts
ESM	Type 921-A radar warning
Radars	Snoop Tray I-Band Surface Search
Sonars	Trout Cheek hull mounted active/passive search and attack

Source : Global security

China admits secretly salvaging British submarine HMS Poseidon

China has admitted secretly salvaging a British submarine sunk in an accident in 1931, but claimed there was no sign of the remains or personal effects of the 18 men who were entombed in HMS Poseidon when it went down off the former naval base of Weihai. 

Beijing has only confirmed that it raised and scrapped the Poseidon in 1972 after its fate was reported by The Daily Telegraph shortly after the anniversary of the sinking on June 9.

But China's claim that the hull of the vessel contained no human remains, identity tags, watches, rings or other personal items has provoked anger among relatives of the men who died.

"It was a shock to discover the Chinese authorities' claims and I'm deeply upset and disappointed," said Penny Lewis, whose grandfather, Able Seaman Frederick Tolliday, died in the accident.

"And that is not only for myself, but especially on behalf of my father and grandmother who were both still alive in 1972 when the Poseidon was recovered," she said.

"The Royal Navy has always maintained that a large number of the crew never escaped from the vessel, including my grandfather, but this conflicts with the Chinese saying no remains or personal effects were discovered. Who is telling the truth?" said Mrs Lewis, 51, from Stevenage, Herts.

In a statement, the Ministry of Defence said it "takes very seriously the issue of the sovereignty of United Kingdom maritime graves."

Chinese authorities informed the ministry that "due to the long time that has passed and the lack of effective record keeping during that turbulent period of Chinese history, they have no more information that that which appears on the Shanghai Salvage Bureau's web site."

It was this brief reference to the raising of the Poseidon during the Cultural Revolution that caught the attention of American maritime historian Steven Schwankert. Subsequent inquiries led to evidence that the Chinese salvaged the vessel without informing London in order to test the skills of their naval special forces and newly formed underwater recovery units, as well as to clear a fishing area of a hazard that had been damaging fishermen's nets for four decades.

And while it is accepted that little more can be done to protest the raising of the vessel, there are hopes that China might be encouraged to conduct a new investigation into the remains of the crew, which experts believe would have been recovered.

After all, they point out, the CSS Hunley, one of the first submarines ever built and sunk in 1864 during the American Civil War, contained eight skeletons that had been almost perfectly preserved when it was recovered from Charleston harbour in April 2004.

"There is no doubt in my mind that there would have been human remains on board, and that means that either the people who raised the submarine lied to the Chinese government, or they are lying to us," said David Clarke, whose grandfather survived the sinking.

Petty Officer Reginald Clarke spent more than three hours inside the submarine before managing to escape using the then-new Davis Submerged Escape Apparatus, a rudimentary underwater breathing system designed to lift sailors to the surface. Eight men managed to leave a bow section compartment, although two failed to reach the surface and another died later.

"The answer the families have been given from the Chinese is completely unsatisfactory and not at all believeable," Mr Clarke added.

The question of the fate of the crew of the Poseidon was raised in Parliament in June by Dr Julian Lewis, the shadow defence minister, who believes that an opportunity still remains for both the families and the Chinese naval authorities to benefit from the situation.

"It is understandable that the Chinese authorities are sensitive about any remains that may have been discovered, but I do hope that they will check their records a little more thoroughly," he said.

"This is because they have a real opportunity to do something positive, by reaching out from their modern navy to the descendants of sailors in our inter-war navy, to strengthen bonds and perhaps even invite the relatives to an appropriate ceremony in Weihai to rebury any remains they have found," he added (telegraph).