Analysts have long wondered if the Chinese navy (PLAN) had a third
island chain strategy, beyond the publicly declared strategies for the
first island chain (centered on Taiwan) and second island chain
(extending from Japan to Indonesia). Many American commentators
believed that such a strategy would refer to the ability to project
power capable of reaching America's bases in Hawaii.
However,
China's recent maritime activities -- such as its extended
counterpiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and its involvement in a
number of port development projects in Indian Ocean littorals (dubbed
the "string of pearls") -- have raised the suspicion in Indian defense
circles that the third island chain lies in the Indian Ocean, and
specifically refers to the waters surrounding the Indian Andaman and
Nicobar islands.
As China's dependence on Middle Eastern energy
sources has grown, so has its concern over protecting its sea lines of
communication for those energy imports. Given projected rates of growth
of the Chinese economy, this dependence is only set to increase, from
between 40 percent and 50 percent today to up to 80 percent in 2025.
Naturally, the PLAN has been tasked with coming up with a strategy that
can secure the lines of communication for China's oil -- not an
enviable task, given the tyranny of geography.
As PLA Gen.
Qian Guoliang stated in an article written in 2000, the threat to China
emanates concurrently from "one point and one lane." While the "point"
refers to Taiwan, the "lane" was an allusion to the long voyage of
Chinese tankers returning home via the Indian Ocean and the Straits of
Malacca. It could be argued that China has built up its military
capabilities to where the "point," Taiwan, is no longer that much of a
concern. But the "lane" continues to be one.
The chief and
most immediate area of concern for the PLAN is the six-degree channel
that lies between India's Great Nicobar Island and Indonesia's Sumatra
Island, where China's shipping is especially vulnerable to Indian and
other forces. Indeed, one of the key aims of India's own impressive
naval build-up as well as the accretion of assets to its Andaman- and
Nicobar-based tri-services command is to "surveillance seed" the Lumbok
and Sunda straits as a non-lethal demonstration of Indian capabilities
-- in much the same way the U.S. Navy is building up Guam. In this
context, China's recent provocations and overall aggressive stance
along the disputed Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas could be seen as
an attempt to make India spend more on its army and air force, thereby
leaving less for India's emerging blue-water navy.
For its part,
the PLAN has also sought to raise the profile of its South Sea Force
through the construction of hardened deep-water bases like the one at
Sanya, on Hainan Island. That base, in particular, is designed to
handle both attack and nuclear ballistic submarines, as well as
possible future Chinese aircraft carriers, the first of which may be
inducted by 2015. Nevertheless, China is still two decades away from
being able to project serious carrier battle groups into the Indian
Ocean, and for the near future, any unfolding "third island" strategy
will depend essentially on nuclear attack submarines and air bases in
Burma.
More specifically, China is likely to resort to a
greater number of nuclear-powered submarine patrols in the Lumbok and
Sunda straits, as well as the northern Indian Ocean, to demonstrate
what it calls a "punishment strategy" for nations making contingency
plans to interdict Chinese energy supplies. The Chinese may also be
looking to station SU-30 MKK attack fighter jets in Burmese bases such
as Ann and Sittwe to extend an airborne strike umbrella over the
channel.
Despite the military posturing around the "third island
chain," some observers feel that the Chinese string of pearls located
further afield in places such as Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Chittagong
(Bangladesh), Gwadar (Pakistan) and Mukkala (Yemen) will remain
essentially commercial ventures. By this logic, China is hoping that
substantive economic relations with Indian Ocean littoral states will
weave a "soft-power web" around India, making it politically costly for
India to take military action against Chinese interests in the Indian
Ocean.
However, India is naturally wary of such moves, which perhaps explains why it refused to give China
either observer or associate member status in the Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium. That 33-member grouping of Indian Ocean littoral states,
started by India, seeks to evolve a common security agenda for member
states in the seas that wash their shores.
The Chinese have also
sought to ensure that their posture does not encourage further
Indo-U.S. naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Despite recent naval
incidents in the South China Sea, the Chinese have consistently sought
to signal to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) the regional nature of
the PLAN's buildup. In fact, PACOM's commander, Adm. Timothy J.
Keating, recently revealed
that a high-ranking Chinese officer had "offered to divide the Pacific
and Indian Ocean regions between China and the U.S. after Beijing
launched its own fleet of aircraft carriers."
Keating went
on to describe the remarks as tongue-in-cheek. Nevertheless, the PLAN
is clearly considering more permanent basing in the eastern Indian
Ocean, as highlighted by comments made by retired Rear Adm. Yin Zhou
last week, referring to the difficulties encountered by the Chinese
navy's counterpiracy patrols with respect to logistics and sailor
health in the absence of port calls.
For its part, India has
already acquired berthing rights in Oman, and may be setting up
military facilities in Madagascar and the Maldives. It seems New Delhi
also wants to convince Beijing that the latter's best chance of
securing SLOCs lies in a "joint initiative," rather than possible
confrontation. Only time will tell whether the "third island chain"
strategy becomes a factor driving heightened geopolitical rivalry
between Asia's emerging giants or, to the contrary, serves as the chill
before the thaw. Source World Politic
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